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A Definition of Antisemitism, While Helpful, Is Not a Cure | Opinion


3 days ago 15
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As far as I'm concerned, the ongoing debate over how—and if—to formally define antisemitism largely misses the point.

On the one hand, I fully agree that one first needs to be able to define a problem in order to be able to deal with it if not resolve it, and antisemitism is beyond question a problem of increasingly dire dimensions. At the same time, however, fixed definitions, like most dogma, far too often are an impediment to intelligent thought.

I am sympathetic to Columbia University's task force on antisemitism which is trying to address the surging Jew-hatred—for that's what antisemitism is—on its campus without being forced to adopt one of several battling definitions. In the interest of full disclosure, I am a lecturer-in-law at Columbia Law School as well as an adjunct professor at Cornell Law School where I teach a course on antisemitism in the courts and in jurisprudence.

Annual ADL Meeting
People attend the the Anti-Defamation League’s (ADL) annual conference on fighting antisemitism on March 7, in New York City. Spencer Platt/Getty Images

I confess that I am by nature skeptical and suspicious of imposed definitions of amorphous terms that are held forth as exclusive, probably for the same reason that I am skeptical and suspicious of dogma generally.

Antisemitism is one such term. Over the years, various definitions of what does and what does not constitute hatred of or antagonism toward Jews have been put forward by well-meaning individuals and organizations, only to be refuted and challenged, if not rejected outright, by other well-meaning individuals and organizations. In one instance, Kenneth Stern, one of the principal drafters of one such definition of antisemitism—the working definition adopted in 2016 by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, or IHRA—turned around and became one of the leading critics of the very definition he helped bring into the world.

The crux of the controversy over the IHRA definition is that its examples include instances where criticism of Israel can mask antisemitic animus. Two of these examples are "holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel" and "denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination," such as by claiming that the existence of the State of Israel is a racist endeavor. Never mind that this definition affirmatively notes that "criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic." Never mind further that the IHRA definition is not meant to be legally binding, or that its accompanying illustrative examples are just that: examples. Because it embraces certain types of criticisms of or attacks on Israel as antisemitic per se, as it were, its critics repudiate it as an impermissible attempt to stifle dissent.

Counter-definitions, such as the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism or the Nexus Document, to name the two most prominent ones, are rejected by IHRA definition proponents as, broadly speaking, defining antisemitism so as to defend antisemitic rhetoric or behavior and, in the case of the Nexus Document in particular, focusing on intent as opposed to impact.

One significant consideration weighing in favor of the IHRA definition is the fact that it has by now been adopted by 43 member states of the United Nations as well as a wide range of international NGOs, states, municipalities, and other institutions. This, for better or worse, has made it an international standard.

Still, the fact is that the IHRA definition and its examples were never meant to be, and should not be regarded as, sacrosanct revelation. Robert Williams and Mark Weitzman, both past chairs of IHRA's Committee on Antisemitism and Holocaust Denial, have emphasized that "While the examples are not a rigid taxonomy allowing for the identification of every type of antisemitism, they are an internationally accepted baseline that can allow us to shine a light on places where antisemitism might exist."

We all know that there have been instances—and there are certain to be more in the future—when an example that made perfect sense in 2016 becomes murkier in relation to behavior or rhetoric occurring in 2024 under circumstances that were not contemplated eight years earlier.

For example, one example of antisemitism in the IHRA framework is "Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis." I understand precisely what the drafters of this example had in mind, namely comparing Israel and Israelis to the Nazi perpetrators of the Holocaust, and I agree that doing so is indeed antisemitic. But then you have extremist far-right ministers of the present Israel government engaging in hateful rhetoric toward the Palestinians, something most probably not anticipated by the drafters of the definition eight years ago. At this time, we can still finesse this particular issue by arguing that such rhetoric does not represent Israel government policy, which it doesn't. But what if it does so at some point in the future? What if today's outliers somehow become part of tomorrow's mainstream?

With respect to Zionism as an ideology, I agree in principle with Kenneth Stern, the aforementioned critic of the IHRA definition, who argues that "on a college campus, where the purpose is to explore ideas, anti-Zionists have a right to free expression."

What such anti-Zionists do not have, however, is the right to engage in hate speech or physical violence against Jews who support and identify with Israel or, it should be obvious, against Jews generally.

It's not holding or voicing anti-Zionist views that's the problem, it's vilifying and demonizing Zionism as an ideology and Zionists both as individuals and as a collective. And when Jewish students are called upon to repudiate Zionism or support for Israel in order not to be ostracized by their peers, the antisemitic trajectory is complete.

Those university and college activists who vilify Jewish students for supporting or identifying with Israel are antisemitic. This does not mean that pro-Palestinian or even anti-Israel demonstrators do not have the right to protest. The issue is the tenor of such protest.

When demonstrators demonize Israel and call for its eradication as a nation state while screaming "Death to Israel" or "Death to the Jews," that is antisemitism on steroids with or without a definition.

My own approach is that I consider the IHRA definition to be an important educational resource and believe that the examples accompanying it should be regarded as persuasive but not exclusive or exhaustive guidelines. These examples should also at all times be subject to rational critical examination as well as to a reasonableness and common sense test in considering whether an action or statement is antisemitic. Accordingly, rather than formally adopting the IHRA definition, a university or college can and probably should follow the lead of the Biden administration's National Strategy to Counter Antisemitismand acknowledge it as the "most prominent" among a number of definitions "which serve as valuable tools to raise awareness and increase understanding of antisemitism."

Far more important, I would think, is for the said universities and colleges to do their utmost to enable highly charged issues to be discussed in an atmosphere of mutual respect and tolerance.

My point is that nuance is important, even with respect to—perhaps especially with respect to—a highly charged issues such as antisemitism. And nuance may elude definitions.

In the context of the ongoing Israel-Hamas war which has brought much of present-day antisemitism to a boiling pitch, we must be able to appreciate that one can mourn the Israeli victims of the terrorist attack on Oct. 7, and be distressed by the subsequent intense suffering of Palestinian civilians in Gaza. One can vehemently condemn Hamas terrorism and just as forcefully support Palestinian rights. One can and should be equally dismayed and appalled by a Jewish college student being vilified and physically threatened in a bar by a fellow student because of her support for Israel and by a Muslim student being spat on for wearing a hijab. On occasion, one must even be able to understand the pain of those on the other side of the barricades.

While a definition of antisemitism is can be a useful starting point, it does not provide an antidote to hatred . Simply put, it's not productive only to look backwards and analyze what went wrong, which is essentially what a definition accomplishes. Our task going forward—on university and college campuses as well as in society at large—must be to work together to stem the tides of antisemitism, Islamophobia, racism, homophobia, and other bigotries before they turn into a tsunami beyond our control.

Menachem Z. Rosensaft is adjunct professor of law at Cornell Law School, lecturer-in-law at Columbia Law School, and General Counsel Emeritus of the World Jewish Congress. He is the author of Poems Born in Bergen-Belsen (Kelsay Books, 2021) and of the forthcoming Burning Psalms (Ben Yehuda Press, 2025).

The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.

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